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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN
ana BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
Case No. 16416 & 16397

vs.
BAILEY BIRD ana
VIRGINIA BIRD,
Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants brought this action to obtain a declaration of their rights, as lessees, under a lease of a commercial building ana adjoined parking areas, to re-arrange and
control configurations of parking; respondents, lessors,
counterclaimed seeking a aeclaration that the lease contemplates human occupancy of the building involved, and requires
appellants to improve the builaing for that purpose.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court ruled, inter alia, that the
lease required appellants to make, prior to the renewal date
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of the lease in lYBl, at least basic improvements to the
leasehold, including the installation of heating and cooling,
lighting, electrical, and plumbing systems, ana certain
structural repairs, admitting evidence regarding the negotiation of the lease, from which it concluded that use of the
building for gymnasium and/or lodging facilities was intended
by the parties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The lease in question (Exhibit 1), was entered into
November 21, 1961.

It covers the second and third floors of

a large building at 251-253 East Second South Street, Salt
Lake City, together with a substantial parking area to the
rear.

It provides an initial term of 10 years, renewable

twice for additional ten year terms.

The original rent is

$350.00 monthly, to be aajusted at the end of the second
term.

The lease is in its second term, which expires

November 11, 1981.
Appellants own adjoining property in the same
block, in which they operate the Townhouse Athletic Club and
related businesses.

Appellants' Townhouse building is joined

to the building leased from respondents by the parking area
leased from respondents.

Appellants and respondents' other

tenants use the parking area in common.

Except for minimal

after hours parking in the vicinity, appellants have no other
parking for their Townhouse business except that
respondents.

leasea fr~

Appellants have, in fact, extenaed the Town-
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house facilities so that they extend into the leased parking
area.
The lease was negotiated by Mr. Stevenson and Mr.
Bird, and their attorneys, Mr. Hanni representing appellants
and Mr. Tibbles representing respondents.

The lease in its

final form was drafted by Mr. Hanni. (R. 342

et~.)

At the time of the lease, the upper floor of the
leased building had been recently gutted by fire.

These

floors were in need of appropriate structural repairs,
together with installation of heating and cooling, electrical, and plumbing systems to make them tenantable.
et

~·)

(R. 339

Mr. Stevenson inspected the premises, and these

matters were called to his attention, because he had represented that he intended to devote the two floors to use by
his patrons in connection with the Townhouse Athletic Club.
(R.

326

et~·)

Mr. Stevenson plainly stated that he wished to
"tie-up" the space in Mr. Bird's building for future expansion of the Townhouse Club.

(Id.)

He had numerous alterna-

tives for the type of facilities he might construct in Mr.
Bird's building for use by his patrons.

He wished the lan-

guage of the lease left broad enough to permit him a choice
between these alternatives.

(R. 346-47).

Among the alterna-

tives discussed were various athletic facilities and rooms
for lodging.

Mr. Stevenson indicated that he might wish to
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construct a causeway, at the second floor level, between his
building and Mr. Biro's.

(R. 326

~ ~.)

Mr. Stevenson never intimated that he would leave
Mr. Bird's building entirely vacant, except for storage of
excess supplies and materials, and that alternative was never
discussed.

(R. 339

~ ~·)

Since any of the uses proposed by Mr. Stevenson
required extensive improvement of Mr. Biro's building, the
lease was made to provide that improvements woulo accede to
the lessor, and lessee would be given a long, renewing term
at low rent in which to amortize these improvements.

At the

end of 20 years, lessee would be permitted a third ten year
term, but at an adjusted rental reflecting the value of the
builoing as improveo.

(.!2,.)

In fact, appellants have never used respondents'
builaing for anything but storage.

While they have carried

out extensive additions and improvements to their own buildings, they have made no improvements in respondents' builaings.

They now refuse to make any improvements to respon-

aents' building.
In 1973, respondents sued appellants to cancel the
lease, asserting that appellants had failed to take the steps
necessary to renew the lease, and that the use then being
made ot the building by appellants had allowed the building
to fall into a condition not permitted by the lease.
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The

Court, in Bird

v~

Stevenson, Civ. No. 206422, Third District

Court of Utah (1973), declined to cancel the lease.
ARGUMENT
Point I.

The Lease Requires The. Making Of

"Necessary Improvements."
The lease by its plain terms requires the making of
certain improvements understood by all parties to be necessary to make the premises tenantable.
The lease recites, on page 1, that the two upper
floors of the leased building "are in need of repair and the
installation of heating equipment to make the said floors
tenantable."

Paragraph 2 of the lease provides that "Lessee

shall make all improvements necessary or desired by lessee to
the second and third floor of the said building at 251-253
East Second South Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, including
the furnishing of any heating facilities, lighting facilities and building structural repairs," and that "such improvements shall become the property of the lessor, including
the heating facilities installed by lessee and all lighting
fixtures, plumbing or other fixtures so installed by lessee,
upon the termination of said lease or any extension thereof."
(Emphasis added.)

Paragraph 6 of the lease requires lessee

to pay all increased taxes due to his improvements. 1

16. Lessee further covenants and agrees that in
addition to payment of the rentals and making available of
parking stalls hereinabove provided, Lessee shall pay any
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Paragraph 9(f) assumes that the premises will be improved
by lessee, and requires that lessee leave the premises in
their improved condition upon termination of the lease.2
Paragraph 15 assumes that such improvements as are
necessary to make the premises tenantable will be made, since
it treats the possibility of the premises becoming
untenantable thereafter.3
Paragraph l(a) requires that the rent on the
premises be renegotiated prior to the commencement of any
third term, in view of "changed conditions" brought about

(fn. 1 cont.) and all additional taxes levied upon the
said premises by reason of any improvements made by Lessee
including any increase in the general property taxes levied
by Salt Lake County, said increase in property taxes to be
determined based solely upon increased valuation by reason of
Lessee's improvements.
Lessee shall not be responsible for
any increase in taxes resulting solely from an increase in
the amount of the levy.
29.
Lessee further covenants and agrees with Lessors as
follows:
(f)
Upon termination of this lease to leave the
demised premises in their improved condition with all improvements in place that have been made thereon by Lessee.
Lessee shall have the right to remove any furniture or
.
personal property of his from the demised premises including
the second and third floors of the building at 251 East 2nd
South.
315.
If the building at 251-253 East 2nd South is so
damaged or destroyed by whatever means, except by ~he act of
Lessee, as to thereby be rendered untenantable during the
term of this lease, then in such event the rentals payable
hereunder, shall be reduced to the sum of $100.00 per mon~h
from the date the same becomes untenantable to and including
the first day that it shall again become tenantable.
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during the first two terms.
in such commercial leases:

Such a provision is commonplace
it allows the lessor to take

advantage of the benefit of his bargain, the improvements
constructed by lessee, by increasing the rent to reflect the
building's improved state.
While the obligation of the lessee to make
improvements under this lease is contained principally within
paragraph 2, the lease is to be construed as a whole, and the
District Court properly referred to the additional provisions
cited above in making its ruling.

In using these other

provisions to interpret and construe the contract the court
(1) gave meaning to the intent of the parties, (2) interpreted the document consistently with its other provisions,
(3) made effective upon the Stevensens an obligation clearly
intended and (4) produced a more fair and equitable result.
In so doing the trial court, on each of the four points,
followed this Court's clearly enunciated standards for
contract interpretation and construction.

Waverly Oil Works

Company v. R.B. Epperson, 105 Utah 553, 144 P.2d 286 (1943);
Driggs v. Utah State leachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417,
142 P.2d 657 (1943); Ross. v. Producers Mutual Insurance
Company, 4 Utah 2d 396, 295 P.2d 339 (1956); Plain. City
Irrigation Co. v. Hooper Irrigation Co., 11 Utah 2d 188, 356
P.2d 625 (1960); Stangl v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1976);
Mark steel Corp. v. Eimco, 548 P.2d 892 (Utah 1976); Thomas
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J,

Peck.

&

Sons, Inc.

v. Lee. Rock Products,. Inc., 30 Utah 2d

187, 515 P.2d 446 (1973).
The term "tenantable," as used in conveyances of
commercial properties, such as this lease, has a fixed and
known meaning.

It means fit for human occupancy for the

commercial purposes intended.

~'

Wolff v. Turner, 65 S.E.

41 (Ga. App. 1909); Acme Gro.uno. Rent Co .• v .• Werner, 139 N.w.
314 (Wis. 1912); Louis. v. Ada. Lodge No. 3, Inoependent Order
of Odd Fellows, 254 P.2d 1095 (Idaho 1956); Mottman
Merchantile Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 100 P.2d 16
(Wash. 1940).

There can be no serious question that the pre-

sent lease intends lessee to make the building tenantable, or
that certain improvements - heating and cooling, electrical,
plumbing, structural repair of fire damage - were agreed to
be necessary for that purpose.

The only question that arises

is not whether the building should be made fit for human
occupancy, but what form of human occupancy was contemplated,
given the alternatives discussed at the time of making the
lease.

That question arises only because appellants

requested that the lease not bind them to a specific choice,
representing that they would choose in due course from among
the alternatives proposed.
Against this plain language of the lease, appellants interpose only the observation that paragraph 2 provides that lessee "shall make all improvements necessary 9E

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

desired by lessee."
phrase were

Appellants read this language as if the

"necessary~

or aesired by lessee"; as if, in

tact, lessee were the arbiter of what was necessary as well
as what he desired.

The actual language aoes not comport

with appellants' reading, and the reading does not account
for the immediately iollowing provisions that the "necessary
or desired" improvements are "including the furnishing of any
heating facilities, lighting facilities and builaing structural repairs", and that "such improvements shall become the
property of the lessors, including the heating facilities
installed by Lessee and all lighting fixtures, plumbing or
other fixtures so installea by lessee."

Plainly, lessee does

not have aiscretion about the "necessary improvements".
are as enumerated:

They

heating and cooling, plumbing, electrical

and structural repairs.

It is immaterial on this appeal that

lessee may have discretion about "aesired" improvements:

the

judgment here is for the necessary improvements only.
Appellants' argument that the purpose of paragraph
2 is the negative one "to emphasize that Bird was not responsible to make (improvements)" is specious.

Paragraph 4

specifically provides that lessor shall not be responsible
tor improvements.

Point II.

The Court Properly Admitted Testimony

Regaraing Negotiations For The Lease.
The District Court's interpretation of the language
ot the lease regarding necessary improvements is fully justi-
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fied without resort to other evidence.

It is also supported

by evidence admitted by the Court regarding the negotiation
of the lease.
Appellants object to the admission of evidence of
the negotiations of the parties for the lease, on the ground
that it was parol proffered for the purpose of varying the
terms of the agreement.

The evidence was neither proffered

nor admitted for such purposes.
In the main, the evidence was offered for the
purpose of showing the types of human occupancy discussed by
the parties in the negotiations.

The purpose was not to

alter the requirement of the lease regarding making the
premises tenantable, but to show the kinds of tenancies
contemplated.

The Court heard evidence regarding discussion

of use of the premises by lessees' Townhouse Athletic Club
patrons for various athletic endeavors and for lodging, and
the entire lack of discussion of the possibility that the
premises would not be used for human occupancy.
The Court was entitled to admit this evidence both
for the purpose of disposing of appellants' claim that the
language of the lease was intended to permit them an option
whether to improve the premises, and to clarify the question,
created by appellants' request that the lease not limit them
to a specific kind of occupancy, of the purposes for which
improvements were required by the lease.

Such evidence is

always permissible for the purpose of clarifying the terms of
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an agreement if the Court entertains any uncertainty about
them.

See Russell v. Park City Corp., 548 P.2d 889 (Utah

1976); Ewell & Sons, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp, 27 U.2d
188, 493 P.2d 1283 (1972); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v.
Stewart, 4 U.2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955).
POINT III.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That

The Necessary Improvements Must Be Completed On Or Before
1981.
Appellants very briefly argue (page 5 of appellants' brief) that the trial court erred when it held that
appellants must make the improvements before the 1981
expiration date of the first ten year renewal term of the
lease.

Appellants assert that, since they might renew the

lease in 1981, any obligation to improve the premises would
not arise until the expiration of the second ten year option
term of the lease in 1991.
The argument is misleading because plaintiffs can,
of course, choose not to renew the lease.

Thus, they would

attempt to escape completely from the clearly imposed duty to
make improvements to the premises.

In fact, the improvements

are required to be _in place at any time the lease is
terminated (or lessors would have a claim for the value of
those not done), and in no case later than November 11, 1981,
at which time the lease is to terminate or continue with the
rent adjusted upward in view of the improved conaition of the
premises.
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In concluding that the lease requires the necessary
improvements to be completed by the end of the first ten year
option period in 1981, the court specifically referred to
paragraph l(b) which provides for the second ten year renewal
of the lease.

This provision states that for the second

option period a new rent will be either agreed upon or
arbitrated, with the new rent to be based upon the state of
the premises.

The court drew from these provisions the

reasonable conclusion that the parties contemplated that the
required improvements would be made prior to the 1981
expiration date.

As the court summarized its ruling:

(I)t was recognized by the parties at
the time that they would take a look at
the facilities and what fair rental would
be, and if they couldn't agree, they had
an arbitration set forth in that lease as
to what rental properties would be. And
it appears to me that it was contemplated
that those rooms being finished at least
by the end of the second ten year period
would be taken into consideration.
(R.
372).

Point IV.

Lessor's Counterclaim Is Not Barred

By Res Judicata.
Since the improvements necessary or desirable to
make are not due to be turned over to lessor until
termination of the lease, it would be permissible, though
apparently not anticipated, for lessee to postpone making the
improvements for some part of the first twenty years (the
first two ten-year terms) so long as he keeps the lease in
effect, intends to make the improvements, and leaves time to
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do so before the end of the second ten years.
paragraph 1 comes into play.

At that point,

It requires that the rent be

renegotiated upon commencement of the third ten-year term in
view of changes that have come about.

Chief of such changes

that would require renegotiation of the rent would be, of
course, improvements enhancing the value of the building.
Paragraph 1 therefore contemplates that the "necessary"
improvements be completed before renegotiation of the rent at
the commencement of the third term of the lease.
The plain intent is that, at the end of the first
two terms, the lessor have a building tenantable as a public
commercial space, and that lessee thereupon commence paying
rent accordingly.
Regardless of the year in which the lease is
terminated, upon termination the "necessary" improvements and
any "desired" improvements actually constructed, are due to
be turned over to the lessor.

If the "necessary"

improvements have not been completed, the lessor would be
entitlea to tneir value in aamages.
Lessor's counterclaim asserts his right to the
"necessary" improvements of heating and cooling, lighting ana
electrical, plumbing, and structural repairs.

These are

required to be made by November 21, 1981, the commencement of
the third ten-year term of the lease.
Plaintiff's only response to this claim is an
assertion that the matter has been adversely decided in ~
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v. Stevensen, supra, and that judgment therein is res judicata herein.

The Order in that case has no effect upon the

lessor's right to relief in this.
The Order in the earlier case first finds that the
lease had been renewed, and that, as of the date of the
Order, lessee's uses of the second and third floors of the
demised building had not created a condition forebiaden by
the lease.

At that time, lessee had made no improvements to

the building.

Lessee apparently now reaas this ruling as one

that no improvements are ever aue.

In fact, to the extent it

bears upon the question of improvements at all, it is merely
one that, the lease having been renewed rather than terminated, no improvements were then due to be turned over to
lessor, so that lessee's failure then to have constructed any
improvements was not a violation of the lease.

The ruling

effectively gave lessee the remainder of the renewal term in
which to make improvements.
The earlier action did not involve the question
presented here of whether upon termination of the lease, or
at the outset of the third term, the specified improvements
were due.

Nothing in the ruling on the question ~osed by the

earlier case implies any conflict with the ruling on the
question posed by the later case:

both find that

improvements are not due to be constructed while the lease
remains in effect during the first two terms.
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j

I

Specifically, lessee relies upon a single conclusion of law in the earlier matter.

There Judge Gordon R.

Hall found that:
2. The written lease does not require
any conditions, use, maintenance or
repairs in regard to said second and
third floors of said building different
from the use defendant is presently
making of said floors.
(Conclusion of
Law 2 in Civil No. 206422) (Ex. 15).
This language specifically refers to "present" use, and
has no bearing upon ultimate duty.
This conclusion is strengthened by a reading of the
additional conclusions of law and findings of fact found in
Exhibit 15.

In the eight findings of fact no reference is

made to any duty to make improvements; indeed, all eight of
the findings refer specifically to uses made of the premises
during the period prior to the entry of those findings.
The same is true of the four conclusions of law.
None of them refers to any duty to improve the premises.

All

references are to past uses of the premises.
Thus, res judicata is not applicable under the rule
stated in East Millcreek Water Company v. Salt Lake City, 108
Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863 (1945),

As this Court stated:

"This action does not involve the same
claim, demand or cause of action tba~ was
litigated in the former action. It does
involve the interpretation of the same
contract, but the question to be determined in the two actions are different,
the provisions governing in this case are
different from those governing in the
former case. In fact the provisions
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governing this case had not become effective at the time the other case was
tried. and in view of the fact that there
was not nor could there have been any
bona fide dispute on the interpretation
of such provisions.
(159 P.2d at 866)
(Emphasis added).
See also Leone v.
Zuniga, 84 Utah 419, 34 P.2d 699 (1934).
The relief sought in the earlier action was to
have the lease cancelled and damages assessed because lessee
had failed to mail the proper notice required to renew at
end of the first ten-year term.

~e

Lessee had apparently mailed

the notice late and had continued to pay rent, and the
defense was that lessor had not been damaged, while
cancellation of the lease would deprive lessee of property
crucial to the conduct of his business.

The Court in balanc-

ing the equities appears to have ruled that the damage to a
substantial business, together with the imposition of
damages, was a consequence to lessee that far outweighed the
consequences to lessor, late receipt of the notice of
renewal.

Lessee takes this ruling as one that he may now

avoid his chief responsibility under the lease, regardless of
consequences to the lessor.
The lease in this case sets a low rent, with a
long, renewing term, so that lessee can construct the
improvements needed by lessor, and can amortize their costs
over a substantial time.

In exchange for having let the

property for a low rent for twenty years, the lessor gets
certain improvements, with an increased rental during the
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third ten-year term.

Lessee wishes the lease to be read to

permit lessee to pay the same low rental throughout the
entire thirty years, and to avoid entirely the making of any
improvements.

~

In fact, lessee has had eighteen years use of the
leased building in which he could have amortized the needed
improvements, but in which he has paid nothing.

If he is

permitted to renew for a third term, he will have an
additional twelve years in which to amortize the improvements
required.

In either case, there is certainly nothing unfair

or onerous in requiring him, by the end of the first twenty
years of the lease, to have made the necessary improvements,
or to have paid their value to lessor, in order to keep the
lease in effect.

On the other hand, to refuse to enforce the

plain language of the lease in lessor's behalf permits lessee
to defraud lessor, and will result in imposing upon lessor
for thirty years an extremely bad bargain as to rental, at
the end of which lessor will be given back a once valuable
building now rendered wholly useless.

Obviously, the balance

of equities at this time has become entirely reversed from
the situation which existed at the time of the earlier
trial.
CONCLUSIONS
Lessee in this case asserts extremely strained
readings of the lease and an earlier ruling of the District
Court in order to avoid his chief obligation under the lease.
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The District Court quite properly rejected this attempt.
None of appellants' objections to the ruling below have
merit.

The ruling should be affirmed.
DATED this ~'~-day of,~'.--'-"------', 1979.
Respectfully submitted,

BERMAN & GIAUQUE
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

By~~~-'-_.,...~-"~~~~~

E. Craig Smay
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents
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